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SECURITIES REGULATION-THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE UNDER
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S SECTION lOeb) AND
RULE IOb-5-Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The stock market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930's
prompted the enactment of statutory regulations designed to curtail
abuse in the securities industry.l The drafters of the various statutes 2
hoped to achieve a "high standard of business ethics" and equality in
the marketplace. 3 The path to the seemingly idealistic target required
the substitution of a standard of full disclosure in the securities mar
ketplace for the time-honored standard of caveat emptor, or "let the
buyer beware."4 In fact, courts and practioners refer to this stricter
standard when interpreting and applying securities law,s thus spawn
ing comment from legal authority aimed at analyzing the usefulness of
the duty of disclosure in a practical setting. 6
This note focuses on Section lOeb) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 7 and Rule lOb-5 8 promulgated under its authority. Specifi
cally, this note examines the duty of disclosure as applied to those in
1.
2.

S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).

Id. (citing Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Ex
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.c. §§ 78a-78kk (1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.c. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, IS U.S.C. §§ 77aaa
77bbbb (1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, IS U.S.c. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982».
3. Id. at 186; see infra note 5.

4. S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
5. Rule IOb-5 "is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities mar
ketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information." S.E.c. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
"The maintenance of fair and honest markets in securities and the prevention of inequitable
and unfair practices in such markets are primary objectives of the federal securities laws.
Congress has recognized the essential importance of providing full information for both the
buyer and seller." In re Investors Management Co., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633, 639 (1971) (em
phasis added). One who has access to corporate information may not take "advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
6. One may best comprehend the duty of full disclosure by considering it a mecha
nism to prevent unjust enrichment, thereby encouraging equality in the marketplace.
Langervoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement,
70 CALIF. L. REV. I, 2 (1982).
7. IS U.S.c. § 78j (1982) provides in part:
III
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possession of material 9 nonpublic lO information, and the judicial appli
cation of the standard in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc."

II.

FACTS OF

Moss

In November of 1976, Warner-Lambert Company (Warner) re
tained the services of Morgan Stanley & Co., Incorporated (Morgan

Stanley), an investment banking firm and subsidiary of Morgan Stan
ley, Inc. Warner was engaged in preliminary tender offer negotiations
with Deseret Pharmaceutical Company (Deseret), and subsequently
employed Morgan Stanley to aid in the evaluation of Deseret as the
proposed target company.12
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur
ity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Id.
8.

17 C.F.R. 240.lOb-5 (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

Id.
9. Materiality can best be understood in terms of the reasonable person standard.
The proper inquiry is whether "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [person]
would consider [the information] important in deciding" the appropriate course of action.
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965) (A fact is material if a reasonable person would
have "acted upon" it. Id. at 462). In addition, materiality in a non-disclosure action under
Rule IOb-5 "encompasses those facts 'which in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of the corporation's stock on securities.''' Id. (quoting Kohler v.
Kohler, Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963».
10. Information is non public when it has not "been effectively disclosed in a manner
sufficient to insure its availability to the investing public." S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968).
II. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
12. Id. at 8. Specifically, Warner hired Morgan Stanley to "assess the desirability of
acquiring Deseret, to evaluate Deseret's stock and to recommend an appropriate price per
share for the tender offer." Id.
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At the time, Morgan Stanley employed E. Jacques Courtois, Jr.,
who, in that capacity, acquired information regarding the proposed
Warner-Deseret tender offer. I3 Courtois subsequently disclosed the in
formation to Adrian Antoniu, an employee of Kuhn Loeb, CO.,14 and
James M. Newman, a stockbroker. 15 On November 30, 1976, New
man purchased Deseret stock at $28 per share for himself, Courtois,
and Antoniu. 16 On the same day, Michael E. Moss sold 5,000 shares
of Deseret stock. at $28 per shareP
The tender offer between Warner and Deseret was announced on
December 7, 1976, with Warner offering $38 per share for Deseret
stock. 18 Moss instituted an action for damages, 19 alleging violations of
Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb
5. 20 In his complaint, Moss alleged that individual defendants Cour
tois, Antoniu, and Newman had traded in Deseret stock with full
knowledge of the impending tender offer and without disclosing the
information to Deseret shareholders. 21 In addition, Moss sought dam
ages from Morgan Stanley under a "controlling person" theory, charg
ing derivative liability for employee Courtois' wrongdoing. 22
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed the action against all defendants. 23 The United
13. Id. Courtois worked in the mergers and acquisitions department at Morgan
Stanley.
14. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. (presently known as Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.) en
gages in investment banking. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, IS (2d Cir. 1981).
IS. Moss, 719 F.2d at 8.
16. Id. Two foreign citizens were also informed by Newman of the proposed merger.
The three "conspirators," Newman and the two foreign nationals, purchased and sold
stock on the basis of the information. All five participants then shared the profits. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, IS (2d Cir. 1981). See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the criminal indictment of Newman.
17. Moss, 719 F.2d at 8.
18. Id.
19. Id. Moss commenced the action on behalf of himself and all others who had sold
stock in Deseret on November 30, 1976.
20. Id.; see supra notes 7-8.
21. Id. at 8-9. The lower court dismissed the Section lO(b) claim against all defend
ants. Moss appealed only the dismissal of his claim against Newman. Id. at 9 n.2.
22. Id. at 9. "Controlling person" liability falls under Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act,
IS U.S.c. § 78t(a) (1976), which reads:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
Id.
23. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,24 holding in
part that the plaintiff and the defendants lacked the insider or fiduci
ary relationship necessary to impose a duty of disclosure and possible
liability for securities violations. 2s
III.

ROOTS OF THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE

The law of insider trading 26 and the accompanying duty to dis
close or abstain from trading on material non public information is pri
marily associated with Section 1O(b) and Rule lOb-5P Since neither
the Rule nor the provision specifically articulate the prohibition, the
restraint upon trading results from judicial and administrative
interpretation.28
The Securities and Exchange Commission solidified the concept
of the duty of disclosure in In re Cady, Roberts & CO.29 The Commis
sion imposed the obligation on corporate insiders, basing it first upon
the existence of a relationship which affords access to corporate infor
mation, and second, upon the unfairness of allowing some individuals
the advantage of the information while denying it to those with whom
they deal. 30 The two-pronged theory evolved as the Commission in
terpreted the scope of the language "any person" as set forth in the
rule and in the statutory provision. 3) The Commission reached the
conclusion that liability did not attach solely to traditional insiders,32
but could also be imposed upon anyone with access to corporate infor
mation who used it in transactions with someone not privy to it. 33
24.
25.

Moss, 719 F.2d at 8.
Id. at 13-14. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Section 20(a)

claim, stating that since the claims against the individual defendants were dismissed, the
claim of derivative liability must be as well. Id. at 17.
26. The traditional definition of an insider encompassed a corporate officer, a direc
tor, and a 10% beneficial owner. The definition derives primarily from Section 16 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which requires the disgorgement of profits by an
officer, a director, or a 10% beneficial owner who engages in a sale and purchase or
purchase and sale of corporate stock within 6 months. 15 U .S.C. § 78p (1982). Others may
attain the status of corporate insider based solely on the existence of a special or fiduciary
relationship. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For a discussion of non
traditional insiders see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
27. Langevoort, supra note 6, at 2.
28. See supra notes 7-8.
29. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (involving violations of antifraud provisions of the securities
acts by a partner in a broker-dealer firm who executed trading orders of the basis of non
public material information).
30. Id. at 912.
31. Id. See supra notes 7-8.
32. See supra note 26.
33. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. See also S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
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The ever-present goal of equality in the marketplace justified the
theory of liability.34 In an attempt to protect the unwary, the Com
mission broadly interpreted the scope of the protective securities laws,
implying a duty owed to the general public. 35 The Commission lim
ited itself significantly, however, by imposing the duty only upon those
in a special relationship with a company: those who presumably had
access to inside corporate information. 36
Later cases narrowed and defined the notion of a special or fiduci
ary relationship as a prerequisite to the duty to disclose. 37 In Chiarella
v. United States,38 the Supreme Court firmly established that liability
for nondisclosure of material information could not be imposed absent
the existence of "a relationship of trust and confidence" between par
ties to a transaction. 39 Furthermore, the Court stressed that mere
trade upon material non public information would not by itself impose
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). The court held that Rule IOb-5 also applies to individuals
possessing the information even though they "may not strictly be termed 'insider' within
the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act." Id. See supra note 26 for a discussion of Section
16(b).
34. See supra note 5.
35. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 913. The obligation of disclosure falls not only on
existing shareholders, but extends as well to those who make sales of securities to non
shareholders. To hold otherwise would be to "ignore the plight of the buying public
wholly unprotected from the misuse of special information." Id. See infra notes 86-101 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the misappropriation theory.
36. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. Again, the Commission was attempting to re
strain individuals from capitalizing on an intimate position "lest the uninformed be ex
ploited." !d.
37. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). The Dirks Court described the dis
closure duty as "extraordinary," stating that a duty will not attach absent "legal obligations
other than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud proscriptions in the federal
securities laws." Id. at 3262-63. For a general discussion of arm's length transactions, see
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3rd Cir. 1982) ("one who purchases stock on the open
market who is neither an insider nor a fiduciary, nor a 'tippee' of such a person, need not
disclose the reasons for his purchase, even if the purchase is based on knowledge of material
facts." Id. at 1202); Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., 680 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982) (no duty to
disclose could be imposed upon defendants, who purchased plaintiff's stock on the open
market without disclosing their intent to make a later tender offer at a higher price; the
parties in this transaction were market strangers, and, therefore, no fiduciary relationship
existed); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Funds, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975)
(an investment company's failure to disclose to the corporation, with which it was negotiat
ing a debenture placement, that it already owned a substantial amount of that corporation's
common stock, was not a breach of duty; defendants purchased on the open market, and
such transactions did not impose a duty upon them).
38. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
39. Id. at 228. The Court further held that the duty to disclose premised upon a
special relationship was an established doctrine which should not be altered "absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent." Id. at 233.
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liability.40 A duty based upon a specific relationship between the par
ties must exist before liability will attach.41
The Supreme Court in Chiarella did not reach the issue of
whether the misappropriation theory provided an alternative to the
fiduciary requirement. 42 Acceptance of the theory enlarges the class of
potential defendants, and provides redress for injured plaintiffs who
lack the special relationship established by Cady, Roberts. 43
Parenthetically, since the Court neither endorsed nor rejected the the
ory, speculation exists that it may provide an exception to the fiduci
ary requirement. 44
Chiarella established a standard to be met in cases dealing with
Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5. The court in Moss, following the
Chiarella analysis, determined that the transactions between the indi
vidual defendants and the plaintiff shareholder were at arm's length. 45
The requisite fiduciary relationship being absent, the defendants were
under no duty to disclose material information to the plaintiff. Moss,
however, had advanced several alternate theories, described below, to
support his claim that such a relationship existed. 46 The court re
jected Moss' theories in an opinion consistent with existing law and
established principles in the securities industry.47
IV.
A.

THEORIES OF LIABILITY

The Non-Traditional Insider Theories

Imposing the duty to disclose upon traditional corporate insiders
meets with little opposition. 48 Officers, directors and beneficial owners
of the corporation are deemed fiduciaries of both the corporation and
its shareholders because of their position with respect to the corpora
tion.49 The imposition of a duty to disclose or abstain from trading
40. "[A] duty to disclose under § lO(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
non public market information." Id. at 235.
41. Id. at 227-28.
42. 445 U.S. 222, 235-36.
43. See supra text accompanying note 30.
44. See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the misappro
priation theory.
45. Moss, 719 F.2d at 13.
46. Id. at 13-14.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 26; see, e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968). The defendants included corporate officers and directors who committed sev
eral securities violations. The court held that, as insiders, the defendants were "precluded
by Rule IOb-5 from trading on material non public informatioJ)." Id. at 848.
49. Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983).
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upon those fiduciaries is premised not only upon the theory of promot
ing equality in the marketplace, 50 but also upon the notion that fiduci
aries should place the welfare of the shareholders and the corporation
before their own.51
Since the definitional language is somewhat ambiguous, identify
ing non-traditional insiders continues to be a difficult task. Although
they have "no special access to corporate information" in the sense
that the traditional insiders do, they are charged with the duty of dis
closure based upon the existence of a special relationship between
themselves and the wronged individual or entity. 52 The relationship
may be direct, as in the case of a temporary insider who deals directly
with a corporation and obtains confidential information in that capac
ity,53 or it may be indirect, as in the case of a tippee 54 who becomes
liable because the information obtained comes from a true corporate
insider. 55
Moss presented several theories to establish a basis for the defend
ants' liability. 56 In one, Moss alleged that Morgan Stanley and Cour
tois had become insiders of Deseret because of their role in the tender
offer negotiations. 57 Specifically, Moss alleged that as advisor to
Warner, Morgan Stanley had obtained confidential information from
Deseret,58 the receipt of which transformed Morgan Stanley and its
employee, Courtois, into insiders of Deseret. 59
50. See supra note 5.
5!. At least one court has termed the duty to disclose or abstain as separate from the
insider's general duties. According to this court, the insider's fiduciary relationship with
the corporation and its shareholders creates the specific duty. O'Connor & Associates v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
52. Moss, 719 F.2d at I J.
53. "[A)n underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant working for the corpora
tion" may obtain access to confidential information, thereby becoming a temporary insider
because of the position. Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983). See also S.E.C.
v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). A temporary insider "assume[s) the duties of
an insider temporarily, by virtue of a special relationship with the corporation," and ac
quires the same disclosure and abstention requirements. Id. at 1403.
54. A tippee is one who "knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an
insider and trades on it." Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3263 (1983). Tippees acquire
liability because they assume a fiduciary duty "only when the insider has breached his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach." Id. at 3264.
55. A true (or traditional) corporate insider is a corporate officer, a director, or a
beneficial owner. See supra note 26.
56. Moss, 719 F.2d at 13-16.
57. Id. at 13-14.
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id. In essence, Moss' argument for imposing the duty requirement upon New
man paralleled the argument for its imposition on Courtois. Specifically, Moss' argument

118

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:111

The court rejected the argument,60 stating that Morgan Stanley's
employment by one party to a tender offer did not, by itself, accord the
corporation insider status with regard to the other party. Morgan
Stanley's client was Warner, and therefore any duties and obligations
were owed to Warner and its shareholders, not to Deseret. 61
In Moss, the court relied upon the case of Walton v. Morgan Stan
ley & Co., Inc.,62 which had a factual situation similar to Moss. In
Walton the court held that although the target company may have
placed confidence in the investment company not to disclose informa
tion of the impending tender offer, the investment company was under
no duty to preserve the confidence. 63 The investment company's obli
gations lay with its clients, the acquiring company and its sharehold
ers. Similar to the parties in Walton, Morgan Stanley and Deseret
were "at all times responsible to different interests."64
Morgan Stanley and Deseret dealt at arm's length with each
other. A fiduciary duty does not attach in transactions between mar
ket strangers. 65 Moss acted as an open market trader when he sold his
shares of Deseret stock. One dealing with the impersonal securities
marketplace is subject to inherent risks, including the likelihood that
shares sold one day may be worth more the next.
In the second theory, Moss argued to impose a duty to disclose on
was that if Courtois were considered an insider of Deseret by virtue of his employment with
Morgan Stanley, then Newman should be subject to the same duty to disclose and be liable
for nondisclosure upon the theory of tippee liability. Id. at 13-14. See supra note 55.
60. Moss, 719 F.2d at 13.
61. The court in Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983), noted that in certain situa
tions, "as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, account
ant, lawyer or consultant working for the corporation" a fiduciary relationship may develop
between those individuals and the shareholders. Id. at 3261 n.14 (emphasis added). The
opinion further stipulated that in order for duties to legitimately attach, the corporation
"must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential and the
relationship at least must imply such a duty." Id. It bears reemphasis that in the present
situation Warner employs Morgan Stanley and presumably expects confidential informa
tion to remain confidential. Deseret and its shareholder Moss represent the target company
and do not enjoy the legitimate expectations of a fiduciary duty.
62. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving a shareholder's derivative action brought
by target company shareholders (Olinkraft); the claim was that Morgan Stanley, as em
ployed by Kennecott (the acquiring company), breached a fiduciary duty owed to Olinkraft
shareholders when it disclosed confidential information to Morgan Stanley during tender
offer negotiations).
63. Id. at 799.
64. Id. at 798.
65. See supra note 37 for a discussion of arm's length transactions. See also General
Time Corporation v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1026 (1969) (defendant purchasers, affiliates of a corporation intending a merger with
plaintiff, held not to be fiduciaries and thus not liable for failure to disclose affiliate status).
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Newman based upon a broker-dealer theory of liability.66 Moss al
leged that Newman, in his capacity as a stockbroker, "owed a general
duty to the market to disclose material nonpublic information prior to
trading. "67 The court rejected the argument as inconsistent with ap
plicable law. 68 Despite the fact that equality in the marketplace and
protection of the uninformed lie at the heart of the securities laws,69 a
generalized duty owed to the public at large cannot prevail. Imposi
tion of a generalized duty "departs radically from the established doc
trine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two
parties"70 and hampers the profitmaking nature of the securities mar
ketplace. 71 Congress and the Commission have already addressed "by
detailed and sophisticated regulation"72 instances in which the use of
market information may be harmful to the effective "operation of the
securities market,"73 thereby providing adequate protection for the
public. As evidenced in Cady, Roberts 74 and Chiarella 75 a fiduciary
relationship must exist before a duty of disclosure may be imposed. 76
Had Moss been a client of Newman's,77 or had an insider to Moss or
Deseret disclosed the information,78 a fiduciary relationship would
66.
67.
68.
69.

Moss, 719 F.2d at 14-15.
[d. at 14.
[d. at 14-15.
See supra note 5.

70. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). See supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
71. See General Time Corporation v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) ("We know of no rule of law . . . that a purchaser
of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had
any obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort
the sale." Id. at 164). As the Moss court stated, imposing a duty of disclosure on broker
dealers "could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC
recognized is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market." Moss, 719 F.2d at 15
(quoting Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255. 3263 n.17 (1983».
72. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222. 233 (1980).
73. Id.
74. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
75. 445 U.S.' 222 (1980). See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
76. In the case of a tippee there must be a breach of a fiduciary duty before liability
will attach. See supra note 54.
77. See Lewelling v. First California Co .• 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977) (an invest
ment company employee had a duty to disclose material information to his client); In re
Merrill, Lynch. Pierce, Fenner. and Smith, 43 S.E.C. 933. 937 (1969). In Merrill, Lynch a
broker-dealer company and certain of its employees disclosed material information to select
customers; the Commission noted the "inherent unfairness of disclosure to certain custom
ers." [d. The broker-dealer owed a duty of disclosure to all its customers. and the Com
mission condemned the selective disclosure. Liability, however, flowed from the finding
that the information itself should not have been disclosed to anyone but should have been
held in the strictest confidence. Id.
78. See supra note 54 for a discussion of tippee liability. See also Newman, 664 F.2d
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have existed. 79
Moss advanced a third theory, in which he argued that a duty
existed based upon United States v. Newman. 8o He asserted that since
the Newman court determined that Courtois and Newman owed a
duty to Morgan Stanley, Kuhn Loeb, and their respective clients, the
duty should extend as well to Deseret and its shareholders as the tar
get corporation. 81
In rejecting Moss' third argument, the court stated that the hold
ing in Newman was "explicitly limited"82 to "the allegations of the
indictment, which allege essentially that the defendants defrauded the
investment banking firms and the firms' takeover clients."83 The
court, therefore, could not entertain allegations that target company
shareholders had been defrauded. Moreover, the court emphasized
that nothing in the Newman opinion might stretch "an employee's
duty to 'abstain or disclose' with respect to his employer . . . to en
compass an employee's 'duty of disclosure' to the general public."84
Moss' argument merely attempted to "piggyback" on the Newman al
legations and convictions, and, therefore, lacked any in dependant legal
justification.85
12 (1983) (Newman was held criminally liable for trading upon information he had re
ceived from corporate insiders of Morgan Stanley). See infra notes 80-84 and accompany
ing text for a discussion of Newman's criminal conviction.
79. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972)
(bank employees breached a disclosure duty to the plaintiff corporation; in assuming its
duties as a transfer agent, the bank also assumed accompanying obligations, including the
duty of disclosure).
80. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). The court held defendants had sullied the reputa
tions of Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb, sufficing to establish the requisite duty for a
Section \O(b) violation. Id. at 17. The court imposed a duty even though neither Morgan
Stanley nor Kuhn Loeb "was at the time a purchaser or seller of the target company securi
ties in any transaction with any of the defendants." Id. at 16. The court elaborated "the
courts, not the Congress, have limited Rule IOb-5 suits for damages to the purchasers and
sellers of securities." Id. at 17. Since this was not a civil suit for damages, the court did not
impose the requirement but instead emphasized that the remedial purposes of the securities
laws could best be served by imposing criminal sanctions upon the defendants in this situa
tion. Id. at 16-17.
81. Moss, 719 F.2d at 13.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, IS n.1 (2d Cir. 1981)).
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. In essence, Moss argued that Newman owed him the duty of disclosure be
cause Newman owed the duty to Morgan Stanley and its client Warner. Moss relied on no
discrete argument but simply "piggy back[ed] upon the duty owed by defendants to Mor
gan Stanley and Warner." Id. (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347,
1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
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The Misappropriation Theory

Moss' final effort to establish a basis for recovery rested on the
misappropriation theory which the Supreme Court had not reached in
Chiarella. 86 Under the theory, liability would attach to any person
who traded on the basis of non public misappropriated information;
that is, information improperly obtained or converted to personal
use. 87 In Chiarella the government argued an alternative theory of
liability based on the misappropriation theory. The government pro
posed that the defendant had breached a duty to the acquiring com
pany, his employer's client, when he had misappropriated the
information about the tender offer from his employer. 88 Since the trial
judge had not instructed the jury on the theory, the Court could not
accept it as a basis for affirming Chiarella's criminal conviction. 89 The
Supreme Court refused to "speculate upon whether such a duty exists,
whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach constituted a
violation of § lO(b). "90
The Court in Chiarella, then, deferred the issue of whether liabil
ity can be imposed for trading on the basis of non public misappropri
ated information. 91 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
addressed the question, however, in both Newman 92 and Moss.93 In
86. 445 U.S. 222. The Supreme Court held in Chiarella that Chiarella did not have a
fiduciary relationship with respect to the sellers of stock, and therefore did not owe them a
duty of disclosure. "No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of
the target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not
their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their
trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only
through impersonal market transactions." Id. at 232-33. See supra notes 38-44 and accom
panying text.
87. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring). "A person violates § lO(b)
whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit non public information
which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." Id.
88. Id. at 235-36.
89. "The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because
of his failure to disclose material, non public information to sellers from whom he bought
the stock of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the nature or elements of a
duty owed by petitioner to anyone other than the sellers." Id. at 236.
90. Id. at 236-37.
91. Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion in Chiarella states that "[t]he
Court's opinion, as I read it, leaves open the question whether § lO(b) and Rule IOb-5
prohibit trading on misappropriated non public information." Id. at 243 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
92. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). A recent law journal note stated that although the
court in Newman reached a correct conclusion, the path to that result was misguided. The
author argued that Newman owed a duty to the public at large and not just to those buyers
and sellers with whom he had a special relationship. "Rule IOb-5 criminal liability should
attach whenever a person trades on nonpublic information obtained by reason of a special
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Newman, the court imposed criminal liability in a misappropriation
situation,94 but in Moss the court did not impose civil liability in the
identical situation. 95
The logical inquiry follows: How can there fail to be civil liability
for an action for which criminal liability exists? Causation and stand
ing provide the basis for the distinctive treatment. Although Newman
profited and Moss suffered by their respective transactions on Novem
ber 30th, nothing indicated that Newman's purchases on that day pro
vided the incentive for Moss' decision to sell. 96 Quite probably, Moss
would have sold his shares anyway, and, therefore, no conclusive
proof exists that Newman's actions legally caused Moss' loss.
No question exists that Newman did profit from his market trans
actions. The victim of his fraudulent schemes was not Moss, however,
but the entire securities marketplace, which inevitably suffers from
schemes perpetrated by persons such as Newman. A generalized
harm does not afford Moss, in his position as an individual trader,
standing to bring suit. 97
Standing and causation, therefore, do provide a rational basis for
distinguishing between the applicability of criminal and civil liability
in the same situation. Under a policy analysis, however, the distinc
relationship to any entity, regardless of the nonexistence of a common·law fiduciary duty,
which results in that person having access to information unavailable to the general public.
Only then will public confidence in the securities market be maintained." Note, Retributive
or Remedial: What is the Objective of Imposing Criminal Sanction in Section 1O(b) Actions
Under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act?, J. CORP. L. 527, 541 (1983).
93. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
94. The court stated that Newman "misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-valua
ble nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence." 664 F.2d 12, 17
(quoting United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting». The
court concluded, moreover, that Newman and his "cohorts" had defrauded the investment
companies just as "surely as if they took their money." Id.
95. The Moss court felt that the effect of Moss' misappropriation argument would be
to "grant . . . [Moss) a windfall recovery simply to discourage tortious conduct by securi
ties purchasers," a result which the court felt was not intended by the securities' provisions.
719 F.2d 5, 16. The court reiterated its interpretation of a Supreme Court mandate to
refuse to recognize the imposition of a generalized duty, a duty owed to "all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id. (quot
ing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980».
96. A perusal of the facts presented in Moss fails to provide any indication that Moss'
decision to trade resulted from Newman's actions. In fact, Moss' 5,000 shares represented
only a portion of some 143,000 Deseret shares that changed hands on that day. 719 F.2d 5,
8.
97. In United States
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) and Schlesinger v. Reserv
ists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), the Supreme Court firmly established
that " . . . a direct injury, and not merely a general interest common to all members of the
public, is required for standing." C. Wright, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 13,67 (1983).

v.

1984]

DUTY TO DISCLOSE

123

tion pales. The possibility of recovery would give civil plaintiffs an
incentive to uncover frauds which the Commission might fail to de
tect. Since defendants' liability would be limited to the amount of
profit on the transaction, questions of unfairness would not arise. 98
Civil liability, then, would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the ulti
mate goals of equality of the marketplace by providing an additional
check on securities violations without raising questions of unfairness. 99
The language found in Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, specifically
the phrase "any person,"IOO provides not only for the formulation of
the misappropriation theory, but arguably also provides for its inappli
cability in Moss. A close reading of Cady, Roberts lOl and the majority
opinion in Chiarella lO2 contradicts Chief Justice Burger's interpreta
tion of the phrase. The Commission itself focused on the phrase and
98. "The measure of damages in the case of a defrauded seller is. . . the difference
between the fair value of all that the seller received and the fair value of what he would
have received had there been no fraudulent conduct. . . . Generally, any subsequent prof
its realized by a defrauder through resale of the securities which he has purchased must be
restored to the seller under a theory of constructive trust, provided that such subsequent
profits do not result from the defrauding buyer's own efforts which have given the securities
an increased value subsequent to the purchase." W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, CORPORATIONS
792 (5th ed.-unabr. 1980).
99. Section 14(e), 15 U.S.c. § 78n(e) (1982) and Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14e-3
(1984), allow for the imposition of civil liability against persons who trade on the basis of
material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. Moss brought a Section 14(e)
and Rule 14e-3 claim, which the district court dismissed since the "actions involved in [the]
litigation took place before the adoption of the Rule." Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F.
Supp. 1347, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court held that the Commission, in adopting the
rule considered it prospective in effect, and the rule thus, "should not be given retroactive
effect." Id. at 1356.
Had rule 14e-3 been in force during the time in question, it would have allowed for a
claim of civil liability against the defendants. It seems apparent that the Commission in
enacting the rule attempted to rid the industry of the obvious discrepancies between the
imposition of civil and criminal liability in the same situation. The rule, however, does not
cover all situations in which there may be trading on material non public information. For
example, news of rich mineral deposits in land owned by a corporation clearly would have
a positive effect on the value of the company's stock. A person purchasing stock utilizing
the material non public information, although acting in a deceptive manner, would not be
susceptible to the sanctions of civil liability under Section 14(e), or perhaps under Section
lO(b), unless the requisite fiduciary relationship were present. See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Again, in the above situation, as in Moss, persons
harmed by fraudulent schemes are allowed no compensation, except for the non-monetary
satisfactions that imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendants might bring. Clearly,
the Commission through Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 is reaching the majority of harmed
securities plaintiffs and providing relief. These regulations, then, indicate a positive policy
decision on the part of the Commission to eliminate the seemingly irrational situations that
allow for the imposition of criminal liability but deny civil liability.
100. See supra notes 7-8.
101. 40 S.E.c. 907 (1961).
102. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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concluded that Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-S liability applied only
when a person had access to corporate information intended to be
used only for corporate purposes, and where the use of the informa
tion would be inherently unfair to those ignorant of its existence. \03
Courts should defer to the Commission's conclusion since the agency
was interpreting its own regulation. 104

v.

CONCLUSION

Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-S premise liability on certain securi
ties market traders based upon a duty to disclose. The duty attaches
to parties who have a special or fiduciary relationship with one an
other. \05 The existence of a fiduciary relationship does not require a
traditional insider, but may develop as well in non-traditional insiders
as a result of business associations or special confidences. Trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction are controlling factors in
determining the existence of such a relationship. \06 The requirement
of a fiduciary relationship prior to the imposition of liability encour
ages a high standard of ethical conduct in the securities industry. In
dividuals are compelled to recognize and respect those persons whose
trust and confidence they retain.
None of the defendants in Moss owed a duty of disclosure to the
plaintiff. Moss traded in the open market, voluntarily sUbmitting him
self to the risks inherent in the marketplace. Certainly the actions of
defendants Courtois, Antoniu and Newman should be condemned.
They must answer to Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb, however, since
the relationships there involved were based upon trust. As the court
in Moss emphasized, the requirement of a fiduciary relationship before
the imposition of liability is endorsed not only by the Commission, but
by the Supreme Court as well. Speculation that the misappropriation
theory provides an alternative to the fiduciary requirement is still
without merit, since although the Supreme Court did not condemn the
theory's applicability, neither did it endorse it. Prudence suggests that
this established doctrine, that there must be a fiduciary relationship
before liability will be imposed, should not be altered "absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent."\o7

. Susan J. Lacy
\03.
104.
\05.
\06.
\07.

Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
Dirks v. S.E.C.; 681 F.2d 824, 839 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.

